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realities of international competition, and their  3.5% in 1984) would produce a welfare gain of
welfare costs are huge.  about $0.9 billion - for a net benefit of $105
billion, measured in tenns of the discounted
'Te  United States loses an estimated $14  value of displarced  workers' lost earnings over a
billion a year in revenues through rents lost to  lifetime.
exporting countries through export quotas.  Add
another $7 billion for distortionary costs.
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I.  Introduction
The  United  States,  along with  other  developed  countries,  is  pro-
gressively  abandoning  its  commitment to  the  postwar  multilateral  trading
system. The  shift  towards  bilateralism  is  evident  in  the  proliferation  of
discriminatory  trade  measures,  which  have  increasingly  canceled  the  bene-
fits  to the  world  econfny  since World War  II ef the  successive  rounds  of
multilateral  tariff  reductions  on a  most-favored-nation  (MFN)  basis. Dis-
Criminatory  trade  measures  are  not  only  administered  bilaterally;  they  are
often  undertaken  unilaterally  (e.g. various forms  of administered  protec-
tion) or  through  multilateral  arrangements  (e.g. the  Multi-Fibre
Agreement).  Moreover,  the  MFN  clause  does  not  prevent  countries  not  parti-
cipating in  the multilateral negotiations  from  facing higher  average
tariffs  on their  exports: in  spite  of the  Generalized  System  of  Preferen-
ces (GSP),  developing  countries  exports  to  developed  countries  face  tariffs
that  are  on average  twice as  high  as  those  faced  by developed  countries
(Balassa  and  Balassa,  1984).
Though  accentuated  by  the  recent macroeconomic  imbalances  and
resulting  exchange rate  imbalances  among developed countries,  the  move
towards  discriminatory  trade  policy  practices  has  been  on the  rise  for  the
past  twenty  years. The  rising protectionism  in  developed  countries  in  the
form  of  non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs) retards  the  relocation  of  production  of
mature  industries  from  developed  to  developing countries.  1/  NTB  protec-
tiouiGm  is  congenial  to those  who  seek protection  because  it is  quick  and
lacks  transparency  and  to exporters  who  negotiate  it  because  they  gain  the
rents. Thus,  NTBs  engender widespread  opposition  to  trade  liberalization.
NTBs  also  impose  huge  costs  on  consumers  and  prevent  a smooth  transition  to
the  realities  of international  competition.2
Quite  a  few  studies  have  been carried  out  to  drive  home  the  costs
of  these  special  protection  arrangements. Individual  sector  studies  for
textiles:  (Horkre  (1985);  Tarr and Horkre  (1984);  Cline  (1987);  Keesing
and  Wolf  (1980)];  for  automobiles  [Winston  and  Associates  (1987);  Tarr  and
Morkre (1984);  FeenstLa  (1984,  1985a,  1985b);  Dinopoulos  and  Kreinin
(1986)];  for  steel  [Tarr  and  Morkre  (1984)]  are  among  the  most  vilely  known
studies  thav  provide  estimates  of the welfare  costs of  NTBs  in  the  US.
Perhaps  the  most comprehensive  recent  estimates  come from the  31  case
studies  of  special  protection  by  Hufbauer,  Berliner  and  Schott  (1986).  All
these  studies,  using  a  partial  equilibrium  (PE)  framework.  rovide  a  very
useful  range  of  estimates  of the costs of  non-tariff  px  lon. These
studies  are especially  valuable  when taken individually  because  the
assumptions  of  PE analysis  provide  an adequate  approximation  of  reality
even  thougk.  the  behavior  giving  rise to the  demand  and  supply  curves  used
in  the  estimation  are  not  always  properly  spelled  out. But,  as  we  discuss
below,  when  it  comes to aggregating  the costs  of  all  restrictions  taken
together,  the  underlying  assumptions  are  much  less  tenable.
This  paper  deals  with the problems  of  PE  analysis  by  presenting
estimates  from  a  static  ten-sector  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)
model  of  the  US  economy  calibrated  to the  year  1984  when  QRs  in  textiles,
and  autos  were  in  effect,  and  those on steel  were  in  negotiation.  To  our
knowledge,  the  treatment  of  QR-associated  effects  here  is  more  satisfactory
than in previous  CGE applications. 'While  the US-negotiated  VER  on
automobiles  has  expired,  demand  for NTB protectionism  in  the  US  remains
strong  and  may  be  on  the  rise  because  of  presidential  campaign  politics.  A
new  round  of  estJmates  of  the  costs  of  protection  is  therefore  all  the  more
welcome.3
The  general  equilibrium  (GE)  approach  used  here  accounts  for  three
effects  omitted  by PE  estimates.  First, the  inclusion  of a  balance  of
trade  constraint  (expressed  In  foreign currency units)  removes  an  upward
bias  present  in  PE analysis.  Second, the  effects  of income  transfers  to
and  from  the  rest-of-the-world  (ROW) are  properly  accounted  for  so that,
unlike  PE  analysis, capturing quota  rents affects  resource  allocation.
Third,  ecnuomy-wide  resource  constraints  and  interindustry  linkages  provide
a  more  accurate  estimation  of sectoral  employment  effects.
The  remainder  of the  paper  is  organized as follows. Section  2
outlines  the  model.  Section  3  details the  sources  of estimates  of premia
on  preexisting  QRs in  1984  and  the  sources  for  the  parameters  describing
demand  and supply  elasticities.  Welfare and  employment  estimates  of QR
removal  are  presented by  industry and  in  the  aggregate in section  4.
Conclusions  follow  in section  5.
2.  Model  Outline  2/
The  simulation  model  is a  static CGE  model  with assumptions  that
correspond  closely  to those  followed by the  partial  equilibrium  estimates
cited  above,  namely  a  neoclassical  perfect  competition  Walrasian  model  in
which  a representative  consumer  maximizes  utility  subject  to a  budget  cons-
traint,  atomistic  producers minimize costs, and  the  government  redistri-
butes,  in  a lump-sum  manner,  tax  revenues from  trade  policy. The  economy
has a fixed  endowment  of labor and  capital,  and  faces  an exogenous  balance
of trade  constraint  expressed  in  foreign currency units. Because  we are
interested  in  the  static welfare costs  of  protection,  we abstract  from
investment,  thereby  simplifying  the welfare analysis.  The  components  of
demand  therefore  only  include  consumer  demand  and  intermediate  demand.4
Under  these  assumptions.  it  is  clear  that  the  welfare  changes  due
to a change  in  trade  policy are  the  usual  production  and  consumption  costs
of protection  referred  to  in  the  literature  on the  costs  of protection.
Our  measure  of the  welfare  cost  to  the  US of departures  from  free  trade  is
given  by the  equivalent  variation (EV)  measure  associated  with  the  utility
function  selected  for  the  representative  consumer,  i.e.,
1 1  o  EV  - C[IU(p  ,y  ),  p  I  - ClIU(p  ,  y ).  p
where  C  is  the  cost  function corresponding  to  the  selected  utility
function,  superscripts  o and  1  refer to  the  equilibrium  before  and  after
the  counterfactual  trade  policy  experiment,  p  is  the  vector  of final  goods
prices,  and  IU is indirect  utility  which  depends  on prices  and  income.  3/
The  structure  of the  ten-sector  model  is  described  in  table  1. 4/
To best  capture  the  trading possibilities  at  a relatively  aggregated  level
for  an economy like the  US,  we  have  treated commodities  supplied  (or
purchased)  abroad  and  domestic  commodities  sold on the  domestic  market  as
imperfect  substitutes.  This assumption of  product  differentiation,  which
has  found considerable support at  the  disaggregate  level  (e.g.  Isard,
1977),  is commonly  used  in applied  general  equilibrium  analysis  and  is  also
adopted  in  most  of  the  partial equilibrium  estimates of  the  cost  of
protection  in the  US cited  above.  The  assumption  is  particulirly  suitable
for  the  relatively  high level of  aggregation  in  our  btudy  and  allows  for
the  observed  cross-hauling  in  trade  statistics.  On the  export  side,  the
assumption of  product differentiation is  reflected in  the  constant
elasticity  of transformation  (CET) funct.Lon  between  domestic  and  foreign5
sales.  5/  A  symmetric  functional  form  is specified  for  intermediat_  demand
by sector  (see  below).
Table  1 shows that production possibilities  are  parametrized  by
assuming  CES furctions  for  vn4  -added and  Leontief  functions  between  in-
termediates  (as  a  whole)  and  valae-addad,  as  well as  witnwn  intermediates.
However,  within  each  sector,  intermediate  demand  is a  CES function  between
the  domestically  produced  intermediate  and  the  compu.ting  foreign  intermedi-
ate.  To  give  an example, no  substitution  is  allowed  between  purchases  of
steel  and  other  manufacturing  intermediates,  but substitution  in  purchases
is  allowed  between  domestically  produced and  foreign  produced  steel  when
their  relative  prices  change as  a  result of  a  change  in trade  policy.
Likewise,  in consumption  demand,  we  allow  for  non-unitary  income  elastici-
ties  of demand and  non-zero cross-price  elasticities  of demand  between
domestically  produced  and  foreign  produced  consumer  goods.
Finally  is the  issv_.  of  whether or  not  the  US  would  face  fixed
terms-of-trade  for  the  trade policy changes envisaged  here.  In  previous
single-country  partial equilibrium  estimates, authors have  invariably
assumed  that  the  US is  a  small supplier  and  demander  in  world  markets.  6/
In our  estimates,  we retain  this  assumption  except  for  autos  where,  in some
cases,  we argue  that  differences  in standards  and  the  size  of the  US market
results  in  a non-infinite  foreign  elasticity  of supply. When  we consider  a
simultaneous  removal  of all  discriminatory  protection, at times,  we also
assume  that  the  US  would  face a  non-infinite  elasticity  of demand  for  her
agricultural  exports.  7/
The  description  of the  model  is  complete  except  for  our  treatment
of QRs.  In the  US, for  the  sectors  considered  here,  there  are  no govern-
ment  controls  or  direct  quota  allocations  with resale  prohibition.  Hence,IBM/JDM-021  6
Table 
Model  Structure
1.  Substitution  in  Production  and  Demand
Domestic  Supply
l.a  Production  and  Its  Allccation
Gross  Output  CET
!I  Export  Supply
Leontief
Value  Added  Intermediate
I  I
CES  Leontief
/  \  Composite  Composite
Capital  I.Ir  Intermediate  Intermediate
I  I
.ES  ~~~~~~CES
Domestic  Imoted  Domestic  Imported
Intermediate  Intermediate  Intermediate  Intermediate





2.  Imoort  SuOD1Y  and  Foreign  Export  Demand
Import  Supply: Infinitely  elastic  (except  autos)
Foreign  Export  Demand: Infinitely  elastic  (except  agriculture)
a7
unlike  the  case  of  many  QR  allocation  schemes  in  developing  countries,  the
US system  of  QRs allows  for  market-clearing  prices.  8/ Since  in  1984  quotas
were already  in  place  in  autos and  textiles, we  assume  that  observed
purchases were  at  the  premia inclusive pricGs in  that year.  (The
estimation  of  premia  is  discussed in  section 3).  Finally,  it is  worth
noting that,  following the  calibration  procedures in  applied  general
equilibrium  models,  we are  assuming  that  the  prices  and  quantities  observed
in 1984  correspond  to  an equilibrium  of the  US economy  with  normal  capacity
utilization  and  in  which  the  only  distortions  are  the  QRs  and  tariff  on
imports. This  may  be viewed  as  a  strong  assumption  but  it is implicit  as
well in  all  other  estimates  of the  costs  of protection.
Host  previous GE  studies of  the  costs of  protection (e.g.
Deardorff  and  Stern  (1986) and  Whalley  (1985)) that  have  dealt  with QRs
have done  so in  the  context  of global  models  where  QRs  have  been  treated  by
their  tariff  equivalents  without including the  associated  rent  transfer
that  occurs  with the  US QRs.  Moreover,  the  choice  of functional  forms  has
resulted  in  excessively  large  terms-of-trade  effects  for  unilateral  changes
in trade  policy  (see  footnote 6).  9/  Both  problems  are  remedied  in  our
approach.
3.  Elasticity  and  Premia  Estimates
The  accuracy  of our  estimates of  the  welfare  costs  of protection
depend  on the  assumptions  embodied  in  the model,  on the  estimates  of  pre-
existing  premia  due  to  QRs in  existence and  on the  supply  and  demand  elas-
ticity  estimates.  With  respect to  the modelling  assumptions,  with the
possible  exception  of  noncompetitive  behavior in  autos  (see  Winston  and
Associates (1987) and  Dixit  (1987)), our  assumptions  are  certainly8
plausible  and  representative.  Hence  considerable  effort  was  de'-c:ed  to a
*parameter  search' for  elasticities of  demand  and  supply and  to
constructing  premia  estimates  for  existing QRs  in textiles  and  autos. We
discuss  these  briefly  below.  (Tarr  (1988, chaps.  6 and  7) is  devoted  to a
detailed  discussion  of  how these  estimates  were  derived.)
Table  2  presents  all  the  necessary  elasticities  and  our  construc-
ted  estimates  of  pre-existing  premia. The  elasticities  reported  in ta>''  2
corres mnd  to the 'central'  elasticities. When  we report  the  likely  %nge
of  welfs  e costs  from  removing  all  trade  restrictions  in table  4  below,  we
are  reporting  results from the  'low' and  "high' elasticities  that  are
derived  from  the 'central'  elasticities  in  table  2  by subtracting  (adding)
a standard  deviation.  10/  Because much  econometric  work has  been  done  to
estimate the  capital/labor  substitution elasticities,  we  are  fairly
confident  abcut  the  relative  accuracy of  these  elasticities.  We are  also
fairly  confident  in  the  estimates  of import  demand  elasticities  for  which  a
number  of estimates  are  available.  Less  confidence  can  be placed  on export
supply  elasticities.  However,  because  these  latter  elasticities  only  enter
indirectly  into  our  estimations,  we  have  found  that  our  welfare  estimates
are  quite  insensitive  to considerable  changes  in their  values.  11/
Turning  to the  estimation  of the  premia  rates  estimates  (expressed
as a  percent  of  landed US  imrort price  inclusive of tariffs),  we have
relied  on  Hamilton  (1988)  for  apparel.  In  order  to  understand  the  problem
of the  premia  rate  estimation,  it is  crucial  to recognize  that  the  existing
MPA arrangements  allow  a  number  of  marginally  inefficient  foreign  suppliers
to sell  in the  U.S.  If  the  MFA  were  abolished,  many  of them  would  be
squeezed  out  of the  US  market by  competition.  The  quota  premium  rate
earned  by these  inefficient  suppliers,  is  less  than  the  quota  premium  rateTabl-  2
Elasticity  Specification  (Central  Case)
Elasticity  of
Elasticity  of  Elasticity  of  Transformtion Price  Elestieities
Substitution  Substitution  Dometic/Export of  Final  Demand  Premis
ColuIn Notes  Intermdiates  (.)  Capital/Labor  Sales  Dometic  Imports  Rates
Sector  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (S)  (6)
Agriculture  a  c  *  k  f  1.4  0.6  4.0  0.76  0.3
Feed  a  c  '  f  f  0.8  0.3  3.0  0.90  1.1
Mining  b  b  *  j  f  0.5  0.3  S.0  0.50  1.0
Iron  and  Steel  a  d  *  I  f  8.0  1.0  8.0  1.0  1.4
motor Vehicles  a  c  *  h  h  2.0  0.8  3.0  1.2  1.1  22.61
Toxtiles  and  Apparel  i  c  *  I  f  2.6  1.0  8.0  0.4  3.9  40.6X
Other Manufactures  a  c  *  *  t  8.6  0.3  8.0  1.6  1.8
CUher  Conwusor  a  c  t  t  3.2  0.8  3.0  1.9  2.4
Traoed  Services  b  c  *  g  g  2.0  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.6
Noe-Traded  Services  b  g  0.0  0.6
(.)  CES  and CET  functions  imply that  the  corrsponding  elasticities  of  subatitutIon  (transformation)  corr  eond  to  comp  nsated
import  demand  (export  supply) elasticities.
All  price  elasticities  if  demand  defined  as positive  numbrs. For premla estimates,  a  text.
Column  notes  correspond  to  te sources  from which estImtes  are Interpolated.  For  Interpolation  detilIs  ao  Tarr  (198).
(a) ShiellI,  Deardorff  and Stern  (1906);  (b) Dixon at  *l.  (1962);  (e)  Caddy  (1976);  (d)  kman;  (e)  own  estimates;  (t)  Stern,
Francis and Schumacher  (1976);  (9)  Houthakker  and  Taylor  (1970);  (h)  Lovinsohn;  (1)  Crandall  (1981);  0) Bohi  and  Russell
(1978);  (k)  USDA  (1984);  (l)  Hutbauer  at  el  (1966).10
paid  by US consumers  as a result  of the  MFA.  Thus,  we had to  determine  the
marginal  supplier  to  the  US if  the  MFA  were abolished.  Data in  Hamilton
(1988),  allow  us to  determine that Hong Kong, which  had a  quota  premium
rate  of 47Z  for  apparel sold to  the  US  in  1984,  or a supplier  more
efficient  than  Hong  Kong, would  be  the marginal  supplier  if  quotas  were
removed.  12/  The  US is  much  more  competitive  in textiles  than  in  apparel.
Consequently,  for  textiles  we take  5Z  for  the  premium  rate,  which  is  much
more  conservative  than  the  one (15Z) proposed by  Cline  (1987,  p. 167). A
positive  rate,  however,  is  indicated based on  data  in  a study  by the  US
International  Trade  Commission  (1987). For  autos  we relied  on the  quality-
adjusted  premia  estimates  of Feenstra (1985a) for  Japanese  car  imports  by
the  US.  For  European  car  imports,  we relied  on the  quality-adjusted  price
increase  of European cars  sold in  the  US  estimated by Dinopoulos  and
Kreinin (1987).  Our  reaulting premia estimates, which  are  weighted
averages,  are  40Z  for  textiles  a-nd  apparel  and  23Z  for  autos.  13/
4. Welfare  Cost  Estimates
Since  the  restrictions  are  administered by  the  exporting
c,.untries,  the  premia  accrue  to  the  exporting  countries  rather  than  to the
US.  One  can  therefore  distinguish  two  components  of the  costs  of the  QRs:
(1)  the  income  or rent transfer to foreigners;  (2)  the  distortionary  cost
due  to the  usual  consumption  and  production costs  of protection.  Table  3
summarizes  these  costs  for  each of  the  three  industries:  textiles  and
apparel,  autos  and  steal.  Since the  restrictions  on  steel  --  which
resulted  in  approximately  a 15Z  reduction in  the  imports  of steel  starting
in  early  1985  --  were  only  implemented  in 1985,  we obtain  the  estimates  for
steel  by reducing inteznediate  and  final consumption  of imported  steel11
Table  3
Welfare  Costs  and  Employment  Effects  of QRs: Individual  Sectors
Employment  b/
Change  in  the  Economy-Wide  c/
Welfare  a/  Industry  Losing  Employment
Gain  Its  QR  Relocation
Textiles  and  Apparel
Remove  QRs  13.06  -158.3  158.3  d/
(.15)
Capture  Rents  7.07  -3.3  35.2
from  Foreigners  (.03)
Autos
Remove  QRs  6.9  -1.14  1.27
(.001)
Capture  Rents  6.2  +1.05  30.9
from  Foreigners  (.029)
Steel
Remove  QRs  0.91  -20.7  22.3
(.021)
Capture  Rents  0.78  -0.1  3.9
from  Foreigners  (.004)
Notess  Estimates  based  on central  elasticities.
a/  Welfare  is  EV measure  expressed  in  1984  US billion.
b/  Employment  is  expressed  in  thousand  work-years.
Z/  One-half  of the  sum  of the  absolute  value  of the  employment
changes  expressed  in  thousand  work-years.
d/  The  numbers  in  parentheses  in  the  third  column  are  the  percentage
of  employees  in the  economy  who  must relocate. For  example,  (.15)
means  that fifteen-hundredths  of  one  percent of the  economy's
employees  must  relocate.12
products  by 15Z  from  the  observed  levels  in  1984. This  restriction  results
in a 7?  premium  on  imported intermediate  steel  products. The  employment
figures  in  column  2 are  only  for  the  industry  subject  to quota  removal,  and
the  total  economy-wide  relocation  of  workers is  presented  in  column  3.
This  latter measure is  a  summary of  interindustry  effects  (see.  e.g.
Deardorff  and  Stern  (1986)).
The  figures  in Table  3  reveal that  the  largest  welfare  costs  are
due  to the  QRs in  textiles and  apparel.  This  may seem  surprising  since
that  sector  is smaller  than  autos,  and  imports  are  314  of auto  imports  in
value  (including  premia). Furthermore  the  proportion  of the  total  welfare
costs  due  to distortionary  costs  are much  higher  in  textiles  and  apparel.
This  is  so  because  the  price  elasticity  of demand  for  textiles  and  apparel
is  almost  four  times higher than  the  corresponding  elasticity  for  autos.
14/  Furthermore,  the  relative homogeneity  of  domestic  and  imported  steel
reduce  production  costs  of  distortion.
Because  elasticity  estimates  are  not  precise,  we report  in  table  4
a range  of  welfare  costs  from removing all  QRs  simultaneously  for  low  and
high  elasticities.  Note  that  because the  marginal  benefits  to the  economy
of an  income transfer is  a  decreasing function of  demand  and  supply
elasticities,  the  welfare  gains  from  capturing  the  rents  from  foreigners  is
higher  in  the  low  elasticity case than  in  the  high  elasticity  case. Of
course  these  welfare  estimate gains due  to  the  capturing  of rents  from
foreigners  are  overestimates  to  the  extent that  rent-seeking  activities
dissipate  them. For  this  reason,  an  auction  quota  mechanism  is superior  to
a direct  allocation  of quota  rights to  imports.  15/  Thus  our  estimate  of
the  annual  cost  of QRs  in  these  three  industries  for  the  protection  levels
in 1985  is  between  US$21  billion  and  US$23  billion.13
Table  4




Remore  QRs  21.0  22.7
Capture  Rents  from
Foreigners  (retain  QRs)  16.0  13.8
Eliminate  Remaining
Tariff  Protection  0.59  1.34
(after  QR removal)
a/  Welfare  is  the  EV measure  expressed  in  US 1984  billion.14
It is  quite probable that the  US  has  monopsony power  in  its
purchase  of imported  autos  and monopoly power  in  its  sale  of agriculture
products  because  of its  relative importance in  the  world  market  for  these
products. We have experimented  with  an export  demand  elasticity  value  of 4
for  agricultural  products  and  an  import supply  elasticity  of 5 for  autos.
Insofar  as removing  QRs  leads  to an increase  in  agricultural  exports  and  an
increase  in  auto  imports,  the  US terms of trade  will decline  and  hence  the
welfare main  will  be  leas.  For  the medium  elasticity  case,  including
terms-of-trade  effects  lowers the  welfare gain  from US$20.9  billion  to
$19.8  billion. This  effect  is  small  because  of the  relative  importance  of
quota  rents which  account for  two-thirds  of  the  total  welfare  costs.
Obtaining  the  quota  rents  is  a pure  income  transfer  from  the  ROW  to the  US
whose  effect  is  a  real appreciation  of  the  dollar  (about  1Z)  which  is
accompanied  by a small  improvement  in  the  terms-of-trade  (the  transfer  gain
with terms-of-trade  effect is  about  $100 million more  in  the  medium
elasticity  case  than  without  terms-of-trade  effects). Thus,  the  distortion
gains  from  removing  QRs  with  terms-of-trade  effects  is only  $5.5  billion,
about  22Z  less  than  in the  small  country  case.  161
It is conceivable  that the  US  would  have  monopoly  and  monopsony
power  in  all  the  sectors  in  which  she  trades. Although  this  seems  unlikely
because  the  US market  share  is  usually small  in  her  main import  and  export
markets,  we have  experimented  with  generalized  terms  of trade  across  all
sectors  for  the  central  elasticity case  by assuming  constant  import  supply
for  consumer  goods  imports and  export demand elasticities  of 5 for  all
sectors  except autos  (import supply elasticity of  3)  and  agriculture
(export  demand  elasticity of  2).  17/  The  gains  from QR removal  are
smaller,  but  still  substantial ($16.2 billion).  However,  because  of the
terms-of-trade  effects,  which  result i-n  expanded trade  volume  at  higher15
foreign  currency  import  prices and  lower  foreign  currency  export  prices,
the  share  of  distortionary  costs  in  total  QR costs  falls  from  32  percent  to
8 percent  of total  costs.  Finally,  adding  unilateral  tariff  reduction  now
results  in  a  welfare  loss  of  $2.9  billion  because  of  the  dominating  terms-
of-trade  effect,  a result  similar  to  those  found  in the  global  simulations
mentioned  in section  2.
Our  welfare  cost  estimates are  significantly  higher  than  previous
GE estimates  and  than  mcit  PE  estimates.  This is  so for  several  reasons.
First  we properly  account  for  the  $14  billion  transfer  associated  with the
US system  of  QRs.  Second, our  results  are  not  dominated  by terms-of-trade
effects.  18/  Third,  in  comparison  with  most  previous  PE estimates,  we have
benefitted  from  the  detailed  work  on  premia  estimates  by Feenstra  (1985a),
Hamilton  (1986)  and  Dinopoulos and  Kreinin (1988) which  are  higher  than
previous  estimates.  19,
5.  Employment
Table  5  presents  estimates of  the  employment  effects  of simulta-
neous  removal  of  QRs in  textiles,  autos  and  steel  for  the  central  elastici-
ty case. The simultaneous  removal of  QRe  also  points  out  to conflicting
worker  interests  across  the  three  industries  subject to  QRs.  While  the
steel  and  textiles  and  apparel  sectors would  lose  almost  as  many  jobs  when
all  QRs  are  removed  than  when  they are  removed  in their  sector  alone,  the
autos  sector  gain.  1,900 jobs when  the  QRs  on  steel  (and  textiles  and
apparel)  are  removed concurrently  with  the  VER  on  autos.  This  is  so
because  steel,  an input  into auto production is  cheaper  and  because  the
income  elasticity  of demand  for  autos  is high.  Both  effects  benefit  the
domestic  auto  industry  which  expands  even  when  QR protection  is removed.16
Table  5
Employment  Changes  from  Removing  QRs  in  Autos,  Steel  and  Textiles





Textiles  and  Apparel  -157.6
Autos  2.0
Steel  -16.2
Consumer  Goods  17.5
Other  Manufacturing  78.6
Traded  Services  34.3
Non-Traded  Services  21.6
Given  that QR  protection is  obtained through the  political
process,  one  can  argue  that the  US  Congress has  decided  to  value  more
highly  a  job  in  the  protected  sectors.  Since  the  combined  QRs preserve  174
thousand  jobs  in  textiles,  autos  and  steel,  but  comes  at  a  cost  of  US$20.9
billion,  the  annual  cost  per  job  protected  in  these  three  sectors  is  about
US$120  thousand. This  is  approximately  8(3)  times  the  average  annual  total
compensation  of  workers  in  the  textile  (steel)  industries.
If  QRs  are  removed,  displaced  workers will  incur search,
relocation,  and  retrainivg  costs  (see  Hussa  (1978)).  Net  benefits  from  QR
removal  are  obtained  by subtracting  these costs.  A proxy  for  these  costs
is theadiscounted  value  of the  displaced  worker's  earnings  losses  over  his
lifetime.  20/  This  measure allows us  to  estimate  how  much gainers  will17
have left  after  compensating  displaced workers  for  their  earnings  losses.
Earnings  losses  for  displaced  workers  last approximately  six  years.  21/  A
conservative  estimate  of  net  benefits,  NB,  is obtained  as
5
NB-  E  (20.9  - C  t]
t-0  t (l+r)t
where  r  - 7? is  the  discount  rate  and  Ct are  estimated  earnings  losses.  22/
NB is  US$105  billion,  with  associated Benefit/Cost  of  65.  That  is,  for
every  dollar  of earnings  losses  saved,  the  economy  loses  $65.
6.  Conclusions
In  the introduction,  we said that PE estimates  are  upward  biased
because  they  fail  to include  the  balance of trade  constraint.  An order  of
magnitude  of the  difference  between  PE  and  GE estimates  due  to this  effect
is  obtained  by solving  the  model  with  a fixed  real  exchange  rate  and  hence
an  endogenous  trade  balance.  This would  correspond  to  what is typically
done  in  PE estimates.  For  the  central  elasticity  specification,  removing
all  QRs  would  lead  to  a  current  account  deterioration  of  US$11  billion  and
an  EV estimate  of  US$33  billion.  This estimate is  about  one  and  a  half
times  the  estimate obtained when  the  balance of  trade  constraint  is
properly  taken  into  account.  Economy-wide  welfare  costs  estimates  derived
by  adding up  individual  industry  PE  estimates are  likely to  be
significantly  upward-biased.
Perhaps the  most  striking result is  the  relative costs of
protection  from  NTBs  and  from  tariffs.  While  this  is repeatedly  mentioned18
In  policy  discussions,  few  relative  estimates  are  available.  The  figures
in  table  4  suggest  that  the  welfare  cost  of  tariff  protection  is  between  3Z
(low  elasticity  case)  and  6Z  (high  elasticity  case)  of  the  welfare  cost  of
QRs  in  textiles,  autos  and steel.  Since there are  other  QRs  in  the  US
beyond  those  examined  here,  this  estimate  is  a  lower  bound.
An  alternative  way  to  evaluate  the costs of QRs  is  to  ask  what
tariff  structure  would  give  the same welfare  loss  as  existing  QRs  in  the
three  sectors.  Returning  to  the  central  elasticity  estimates,  in  that  case
the  total  welfare  cost  is  estimated  at  US$20.9  billion  of  which  1984  US$6.7
billion  is  the distortionary  component.  For that  set  of  elasticities,
moving  from  the actual  tariff  structure  to a  uniform  tariff  structure
yielding  the  same  (import  weighted)  average  protection  would  represent  a
welfare  gain  of  US$0.60  billion.  (Removing  tariffs  altogether  would  give  a
welfare  gain of US$0.94  billion.)  Starting  from the  existing  tariff
dispersion,  to  get the distortionary  cost element  of  QRs  would  require
multiplying  each  tariff  by  3.8  times its  1984  value,  which  would  amount  to
an  average  (import  weighted)  nominal  protection  of 152. Adding  the  loss
due  to  rent  transfers  would  require  multiplying  tariffs  by  6.9  times  their
1984  value amounting  to an average  protection  of 252. 23/ It  is  no
exaggeration  to  say  that,  in  terms of protection  costs,  QRs  are  taking  us
back  to  the  early  days of multilateral  tariff  negotiations,  especially  if
one  includes  the  rent  transfer  element.19
Footnotes
1/  See  Baldwin  (1984),  Tumlir  (1985) and  Riedel  (1986)  on the  political
and  economic  causes  for  this  shift in approach  to trade  policy. For
the  US, the  shift towards discriminatory  trade  policy  is  associated
with a  combination  of  the  decline in  US  hegemony  politics  and  an
increase  in  government  intervention.
2/  Appendix  A  lists  the  equations describing  the  model,  the  endogenous
and  exogenous  variables  and  details  the  functional  forms.
3/  Consumption  demand  is  represented  by  the  linear  expenditure  system
which  is derived from  the  associated  Stone-Geary  utility  function.
The  welfare  measure  used  here is  described  in  Varian  (1984),  who  uses
the  term  expenditure  function rather than  cost  function,  and  Deaton
and  Muellbauer  (1980).
4/  The  ten  sectors  ares agriculture  (1);  food (2);  mining  (3);  textiles
and  apparel  (4); autos  (5); steel  (6); consumer  goods  (7);  other
manufacturing  (8); traded services (9); non-traded  services  (10).
All sectors  are  traded with  the  exception of  sector  (10). See
Appendix  B and  Tarr (1988)  for  details  on aggregation.
5/  The  CET  was first  introduced  by  Powell  and  Gruen (1967)  and  has  been
adopted  by Dixon  et al. (1982)  in the  ORANI  trade  model.
6/  The  large country assumption is  always assumed in  multi-country
models  (e.g.  Deardorff  and  Stern,  1985; and  Whalley,  1985). de  Melo
(1986) and  Brown  (1988) argue  that the  product  differentiation
assumption  adopted  in multicountry  models overstates  the  extent  of
monopoly  power  countries  are  likely  to  have. Also see  Deardorff  and
Stern  (1986,  p. 61)  for  a similar  view.
7/  The (constant)  elasticities  are:  import supply of autos  (5.0);
foreign  elasticity  of demand  for  US agriculture  exports  (4.0).
8/  If  market  clearing  was  not  allowed one  would  need  to  use  virtual
prices  in  Hicksian  demand  curves along  the  lines  suggested  by Neary
and  Roberts  (1980) as  for  example in  Grais, de  Melo,  and  Urata
(1986).
9/  An important  exception  is  the  single country  model  of Harris  (1984)
in  which  unilateral free trade by  Canada is  shown  to  be welfare
improving.
10/  As the  sources  for  table  2  detail,  the  estimates  were  obtained  from
many studies.  These  studies generally provide  standard  errors  of
estimates. For  those elasticities  taken from  Stern,  Francis  and
Schumacher,  the  high  and  low  estimates  are  generally  the  high  and  low
estimates  from  their  survey which  are  not standard-deviation-based.
In  a few  cases  the  high  and  low  estimates  are  obtained  by doubling
and  halving the  central estimate.  See  Tarr  (1988, ch.  5) for
details.20
11/  For  example,  doubling  (halving)  the elaiticity  estimates  in  column
(3)  incre4ses  (decreases)  our  estimates  of  the  welfare  gains  with  the
central  elasticity  estimates  from US$20.9  billion  to  $21.0  ($20.8)
billion,  respectively,  or  +  0.42.
12/  We note that estimates  of quota premia,  in both textiles  and
automobiles,  vary  from  year  to  year.  We  obtained  estimates  of  quota
premia  for  1984,  the  year  for which  we  benchmarked  the  model.  Thus,
our  estimates  apply  to  the conditions  prevailing  in  that  year. For
other  years,  the  premia  rates  and  our  cost  estimates  may  differ.
13/  If  the marginal  supplier  is more efficient  than Hong  Kong,  our
premium  rate  estimate  is  conservative  and  the  associated  welfare  gain
estimate  is  downward-biased.
14/  In  his  study  of  the  similar  arrangement  for  quota  right  distributions
among  cheese  exporters  to the US, Anderson  (1985)  comes  to  similar
conclusions,  i.e. that the distortionary  costs coming  from  the
bilateral  quota arrangements  is extremely  high.  Had  we  further
disaggregated  textiles  and  apparel  as Anderson  did  in  his  study  of
cheese  quotas,  we  would  have  found  even  higher  welfare  costs.
15/  See  Elliott,  Sohctt  and Takacs (1987)  for an appraisal  of  such  a
proposal  for  US  trade  policy.
16/  If  one  interprets  the individual  welfare  estimates  in  table  3,  as
linear  approximations  to  the nonlinear  demand  and  supply  curves  in
the  model,  then  the  sum of the  individual  estimates  will  underesti-
mate  the  total  welfare  gain.  This is  indeed  so,  but  the  underesti-
mate  is  small:  for the small country  case,  the  underestimate  from
table  3  is  only  $30  million. This  non-linearity  effect  is  even  more
important  for  the relativeiy  large  welfare  equivalent  (to  QRs)  of
uniform  tariffs  reported  below.
17/  It  should  be noted that, in the presence  of a  balance  of  trade
constraint,  the  export  demand  and import  supply  elasticities  are  not
independent  (see  Whalley  and  Yeung,  1984)  and,  along  the  offer  curve
will  be  less  in  absolute  value than the figures  cited  in  the  text
(see  Jones  and  Berglas,  1977).  The  numerically  calculated  value  for
the  aggregate  export  demand  elasticity  is  -4.6;  the  numerical  value
for  the  aggregate  import  supply  elasticity  (including  intermediates
with  the  small  country  assumption  maintained)  is  6.3.
18/  For  example,  Whalley  (1985,  table  10.2)  estimates  welfare  losses  from
US unilateral  NTB removal and  US unilateral  tariff  removal.
Deardorff  and  Stern  (1986,  table  4.6)  obtain  small  welfare  gains.
19/  See  Tarr  (1988,  chapter  2) for a  comparison  of  our  results  with  PE
estimates.
20/  We  call  our  estimate  a  proxy for these  adjustment  costs  because  we
have  not  incorporated  into  our model  an  endogenous  sector  that  moves
resources,  as  suggested  by  the  theoretical  work  by  Mussa.21
21/  See  Jacobson (1978).  To  be  conservative,  we  measure total
compensation  losses,  which  exceed earnings losses by the  amount  of
fringe  benefits.  Morkre and  Tarr  (1980, Chapter 3)  discuss  the
merits  of this  measure  and  the  alternative  unemployment  cost  measure.
22/  The  estimate  is  conservative  since  earnings  losses  are  zero  after  six
years,  while  yearly  benefits  do  not  decay.
23/  In  that  experiment,  we  are  increasing the variance of nominal
protection  by 3.8  and  6.9  times  the variance  prevailing  in  1984.
Since  the  distortionary  costs  of  tariff protection  is  positively
related  to the  average level of  protection and  to the  variance  of
tariffs  [see  Johnson  (1962)], another  hypothetical  calculation  would
consist  of computing  the  average tariff under  the  assumption  of no
tariff  dispersion  across sectors.  In  that  case,  starting  from  a
uniform  tariff  protection (3.5Z) equivalent to the  existing  tariff
protection  in  1984, the  distortionary  cost  element of QRs  would
require  an  average uniform protection of  24Z.  Adding  the  rent
transfer  loss  would  raise the  average uniform protection  to 48Z.
With  linear, rather than  constant elasticity demand and  supply
curves,  welfare calculations  would  yield  lower estimates as the
corresponding  elasticities  would  increase  as  one  moves  up the  demand
and  supply  curves.22
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Variable  subscripts  indicate sectors.  If double  subscripts  are
employed,  the  first  subscript  denotes  the  sector  of origin,  the  second  the
sector  of destination.  Upper  case  letters are  reserved  for  endogenous
variables,  unless they have a  bar,  in which  case they  are  exogenous
variables  or normalization  constants.  Parameters  and  policy  variables  are
denoted  by Greek  or  lower case Latin  letters.  There  are  i,j-l,...,n
sectors,  of  which  k-l,...,l are  traded and  the  remainder  m-l+1,...,n  are
non-traded.  The  index k(m)  is  reserved  for  traded  (non-traded)  sectors.
NT refers  to  non-tradable  sectors;  T refers  to tradable  sectors.
Constant  elasticity  of substitution (CES)  and  constant  elasticity
of  transformation  (CET)  functions  are  used  throughout.  To save  on  notation,
we note first  that CES  and  CET  functions  can  be written  analogously  in the
I
form  X-CES (X 1, X2; al'  1-m1,  p,  A) whereo-  p  ;  1  py  in  the  CES
1
case  and  o - 1  ;  1  <  p c  * in the  CET  case.  To further  save  on  notation,
we write  the  unit  dual cost  functions associated with  the  CES (CET)
functions  as  PX  - CES (CET)  (PX 1, PX 2; a,  o)  where  PX is the  price  of X and
PX1 and  PX 2 the  prices  of  XI and  X2.
Equations  Listing
Equation  (1)  is  unit  average  - marginal  costs  under  the  postulated
technology  (see  table  1 in  the  text).  Factor  demands  (equations  2-3)  are
obtaified  from  Sheppard's  lemma.  The  assumption  of fixed  factor  endowments
is reflected  in  equation  (4).  Equations  (5-8)  describe  the  choice  between27
Table  Al
Equations  Listin:
1.  Unit  Cost
n
(1)  CVi -CESi  (W, R;  ai, oi'  ADi)  +  El  aii  Xi  PC3i
2.  Factor  Markets
(2)  K1 - XDi  CVi  (R/(l-ai))
'3)  L  i ,  XD(  ¢i)  CvI  (W  Ma)
d  - d  -
(4)  E  L  L  S;  EK  -KS
i i  ii
3.  Intermediate  Products  Demand
(5)  Vji  CESi (VMji,  VD  5  ,6  c",  ACi  )
(6)  VD  /VMj1 - ((l-6  )IU  )  ac  (PDIPMI  )  3
(7)  VMji  -O  j  e  NT
(8)  V  -j  aij  XDi
4.  Output  Allocation  for  Tradables
(9)  XDk - CETk (Ek,  Dk;  7k'  °tk' Ak)
-(tk  °rtk
(lO)  D  k/E  k - ((1-70)/7k)  (PD  k/P  k)28
Table  Al (continued)
5.  Cost  Prices
(11)  PSk  - CETk (ppk PDk;  7k'  tk'  kY; PS  - PDm
(12)  PCij  CESj  (PHIi  PDi; 5it oci, AC  ); PCj  PDm
(13)  PNi -PSi  E ai  PCji
6.  Definition  of Internal  Prices  of  Traded  Goods
(14)  PEk  - PWEk  ER
(15)  PWI  - PVk  (l+timk)  (l+prki)  ER
(16)  PMk  - P  %  (1+tmk)  (l+prck)  ER
7.  Import  Supply;  Export  Demand
_  t-" (17)  PE k-  PIWEk  or  Ek  iEk  (PWE  k)  sk  k>O
(18)  PWMk  - PWk  or  Ck  - Ck  (PWMk)  ;k  >  °
flk  <  a  for  agriculture;  k  <  S  for  autos
S.  Consumer  Demand  and  Market  Eauilibrium
(19)  CD1 ' xd  +  Ipd PDi) (Y  - COMIT)
(20)  CMk  . X  +  (  <k  PHj)  (Y  - COMIT)
where  COMIT  - E  d PD 1 + E  PI4;  EPi+EPkh1
J~  J  k  i 
(21)  VTDi  - VD  :  VTM  -E  VMk
(21)  VTD 1-k  j
(22)  D  -VTD  + cd I  i  i29
Table  Al (continued)
9.  Rationing
(23)  VTMk  VTMk  4  PMIkj>  PMIk (  k+P,)
(24)  CH.  - 4  PMV  >  PM.  k - textiles,  autos,  steel
10.  Rents  on Rationed  Sectors
(25)  RENTCk  t  (  - PHk)  CHk  +  prck  PWMk  CMk  (l+tmk)  ER
(26)  RENTIk  - E (PI4Ij  - PHI'  )  VMHk  +  E VMk  (l+tink)  prik  ER
11.  Government  Revenue  (GR),  Trade  Balance  Constraint  (B)  and  Income
Definition  (Y)
(27)  GR - E (PMVk VTMk  timk  +  P%Ik  CMk  tmk)  ER
k
(28)  E  - E (PWEkEk  - PWHkCMk  - PWk  VTMk)
k
- 0.  (RENTCk  +  RENTI)  /ER
(29)  Y  - WLS + RRS  +  GR +  (1-0k)  (RENTCk  + RENTIk)  -B  R
k
12.  Numeraire
(30)  1  - E PDj  XD°  E  P  XD'30
domestically  and  foreign produced intermediates.  The  allocation of
domestic  production between domestic and  export sales is described  in
equations  (9-10).  Cost minimizing prices associated  with the  selected
technology  appear  in equations (11-13).  The relation  between  border  and
internal  prices  is  given  in  equations (14-16).  These  equations  allow  for
the  existence  of rationing  in  the  base  year  in  which  case  the  premia  rates
prik,  prck  are  positive. For sectors with no rationing,  prik  - prck  - 0.
The  assumption  of  endogenous  world  prices for  final  import  supply  (for
autos)  and  export  demand  (for  agriculture)  is  reflected  in  equations  17  and
18.  Consumer  demand is  described in  equations 19  and  20 and  sectoral
supply-demAnd  equilibrium  is  given in  equation (22) after  aggregating
intermediate  demands  by sector  of  origin.
Becauae  the  textiles  and  apparel  and  auto  sectors  were rationed  in
1984,  we have  allowed  for  the  presence of rationing  in the  base  year (see
equations  15  and  16).  When  a  sector is  rationed  the  premium  inclusive
price  (denoted  with  a  superscript  v)  exceeds  the  corresponding  internal
price  defined  as the  world  price  inclusive  of border  taxes  and  expressed  in
domestic  currency  units. Thus,  for  example,  rationing  of consumer  demand
for  autos  implies  P<>  >  PMk,  k  - autos. Likewise,  when  total  intermediate
supply  of imported  intermediates  originating  in sector  k is rationed,  PMI,j
>  PMIk  by an endogenously  determined  amount  PRk  which  depends  on the  extent
of  rationing.  When there  is  no  rationing  PM4t  - PMk  and  PMI'j - PMIk,Vj
These  assumptions  are  reflected in  equations (23) and  (24). Rents  on
rationed  sectors  are  collected  in  equations  (25)  and (26). What  portion  of
total  rents  goes  abroad  is determined  by the  parameter  9k in  equation  (29).31
Table  A2
Number  of
Endopeneous  Variables  Variables
CVi  - Unit  costs  n
xi  - Sectoral  capital  stocks  n
Ldi  . Sectoral  employment  n
Vii  - Composite  intermediate  purchases  of
sector  i from  sector  j  n2
VDji  - Domestic  intermediate  purchases  of
sector  i from  sector  j  n2
VHji  - Imported  intermediate  purchabes  of
sector  i from  sector  j  n(n-l)
XDi  - Gross  output  of sector  i  n
Di  - Supply  for  domestic  sales  n
Ek  - Supply  for  export  sales  m
PSk  - Unit  price  of  composite  domestically  m
produced  traded  goods
PDi  - Unit  price  of  domestically  sold  goods  n
PCij  - Unit  price  of  composite  intermediate
product  of sector  i sold  to sector  j  n2
PNi  - value-added  price  of sector  i  n
PEk,PWEk  - Domestic  and  border  price  of exports  from
sector  k (Notes  PWEk  mostly  exogenous)  m32
Table  A2 (continued)
PMk  (PM1),PVM4  ,  Domestic,  (premium  inclusive)  and  border
price  of consumer  imports  of sector  k
(Note: PVHk  mostly  exogenous)  2m
PMIk,  (PMIl)  Domestic,  (premium  inclusive)  price  2m
RENTCk,RENTIk  - Rents  on  consumer  and  intermediate
imports  2m
VTDi.VTMk(PHIk)  - Total  domestic  and  import  intermediate
demands;  (Premium  on imported  2m+n
intermediate)
CHk,CDi  - Consumer  demand  for  imports  and
domestically  produced  goods  m+n
GR,Y,ER  - Governiment  revenue  from  tariff
collection,  disposable  income  net
of transfers  and  real  exchange  rate  3
W,R  - Wage,  rental  rates  2
TOTAL  3n2+n(n-_)+9n+12m+5
Note: Number  of endogenous  variables  varies  according  to  model  closure.
(See  text).33
Finally  the  balance  of trade constraint  in foreign  currency  units
(equation 28),  the  overall budget constraint (equation 29)  and  the
numeraire  (equation (30) close the  model.  Note that  the  choice  of
numeraire  implies  that the  (endogenous)  variable ER represents  the  real
exchange  rate. Thus  when  we fix  the  real  exchange  rate,  we fix  ER to its
base  year  value  and  free  the  balance  of trade  B.
Table  A2 lists  the  endogenous  variables  in  the  model. For  our  ten
sector application  with  nine  traded  sectors  and  inflnite trade
elasticities,  the  model  reduces to  a system  of [3n 2+n(n-l)++9n+12m+151-3m
simultaneous  equations since premia and  virtual prices minus  tariff
inclusive  prices  are  positive  (zero)  when quotas  are  binding  (not  binding).34
&ppendix  B
Data  Sources  and  Data  Preparation
The  model  is  calibrated from  the  80x80  interindustry  (I/O)  flow
matrix  for  1982  commissioned  by the  US Forest  Service. However,  since  1982
was a recession  year, after  aggregating  the  110  table  to our  ten-sector
aggregation,  we updated the  table to  1984.  The  updating  was  done  by
applying  the  1982  value added  to  gross  output ratios  to the  1984  value
added  figures published in  the  July  1986 Survey of Current  Business.
(Details  of the  mapping  are  provided  in  Tarr,  1988,  Appendix). For  imports
and  exports,  we aggregated  the  seven digit  level  data  published  by the  US
Customs  Service. For  traded  services, we  used  the  data  in  the  Survey  of
Current  Business  of June  1986,  table  4.1. Next  we corrected  the  data  where
they  seemed  inaccurate  (e.g.  we relied on  US Census  publication  FT-990  for
import  and  export  data  for  Iron  and  Steel). Data  on tariffs  was obtained
from  the  US Department  of  Commerce  publication  FT-990,  of  December  1984,  p.
A-17.  Finally we  scaled the  trade data  from the  Census to  make it
consistent  with the  merchandise  import  and  export  data  from  the  NIPA.
Next  we made  the  necessary adjustments so  that all flows  are
measured  in  US producer  prices  by using the  data  on the  share  of transpor-
tation  and  wholesale  and  retail  trade embodied  in the  export  data  by using
the  estimates  in  the  Survey of  Current Business Table A  of  May  1984.
Sectoral consumption is  determined residually from  sectoral material
balance  equations.
One  final  manipulation  on the  I/O  data  was required  since  the  I/O
flow  matrix  is a  total  matrix that  does  not separate  domestic  from  foreign
intermediate  input  use.  Following the  procedure  suggested  by  Dervis,  de35
Melo  and  Robinson,  General  Equilibrium  Mcoels  for  Develooment  Policy  (1982,
chapter  5)  and  adopted  in  previous  studies  of the  US,  we  assume  that  the
domestic  use  ratio  in  each  sector  is  the  same  for  all  components  of  demand.
Unfortunately,  this  is  the  closest  approximation  that  can  be  achieved  with
existing  information.
Data  on  employment  was obtained  from the  US  Department  of  Labor
publication,  Employment  and Earnings,  January  1985, pp.  186-9.  Capital
stock  estimates  were constracted  from the first order conditions  for
sectoral  labor  and  capital  demand,  an estimate  of  the  wage  rate  from  NIPA
data,  and  an  estimated  rate of return  on capital  of  5.82  obtained  from
Survey  of  Current  Business,  August  1986 and July 1987. (Details  are  in
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